I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Florida International University, with research interests in political philosophy, the philosophy of law, medical ethics, human rights, and the philosophy of biology. (Click here for a list of my published work.)
Outside of academia, I have held positions as a researcher on trade-related issues with UNIFOR (Canada's largest private-sector union) and as a financial editor for Desjardins Capital Markets. I also enjoy sports with balls (both watching and playing).
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2016)
During his career, Ronald Dworkin wrote extensively on an impressive range of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy, but, like many of his contemporaries, international law remained a topic of relative neglect. His most sustained work on international law is a posthumously published article, “A New Philosophy for International Law” (2013), which displays some familiar aspects of his views in general jurisprudence, in addition to some novel (though perhaps surprising) arguments as well. This paper argues that the moralized account of international law we might have expected is conspicuously missing from this posthumous article; with Dworkin advancing an argument based on a form of political realism instead.
Philosophy of Science (2019, with R. Powell)
The debate over the concept of disease is cast as one between naturalism and normativism, with a hybrid view staked out in between. In light of widely discussed problems with each account, some theorists recommend eliminating the disease concept in medical contexts. In this paper, we reframe the disease debate by way of examining Ereshefsky's widely cited criticisms. We argue that while prevailing accounts do not suffer from the particular defects that he and others have identified, they do suffer from other deficits — and this leads us to propose an amended hybrid account that satisfies the institutional-ethical desiderata for a concept of disease in human medicine.
Journal of Medical Ethics (2019, with R. Powell)
“Disease” is one of the most foundational concepts in medicine, and yet debate as to how we should characterize it is no closer to a resolution than when it began several decades ago. Because discussions of “disease” straddle biology, medicine, morality, and culture, disease theorists have angled from many different disciplines in the service of diverse programmatic goals. This situation is conducive to talking at cross purposes and has caused some recent philosophical analyses of “disease” to become rather insular, quarantined from wider social ramifications. In this paper, we argue that prominent critiques have actually misdiagnosed the most serious problems that plague existing accounts of “disease.” We discuss the chief criticisms associated with each approach, and explain why these critiques gloss over the most powerful objections. We then go on to offer a new twist on the hybrid account that not only avoids these objections, but also satisfies the institutional-ethical desiderata for a concept of disease in human medicine.
The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Law (2021, with M. Giudice)
While some forms of transnational law are quite old, such as lex mercatoria, other forms are relatively recent and continue to proliferate. The rise of new, non-state legal phenomena, or at least phenomena which have not received the same quantity and quality of attention from legal theorists as state law, prompts questions about the adequacy of existing theories and frameworks. This is the theme of this chapter, but with a particular focus on the prospects for the familiar philosophical theory of legal positivism to account for the existence and character of transnational law. We shall suggest that while some of the core commitments of legal positivism still serve a useful purpose, other commitments may need to be significantly altered or perhaps even abandoned.
Jus Cogens (2022)
Once limited to issues in maritime and trade law, today the most recognizable examples of international law govern issues such as human rights, intellectual property, crimes against humanity and international armed conflicts. In many ways, this proliferation has been a welcomed development. However, when coupled with international law’s decentralized structure, this rapid proliferation has also posed problems for how we (and in particular judges) identify if, when, and where international law exists. This article puts forward a novel, dignity-based account for how we answer this question: arguing that an international law exists if and only if it is consistent with respecting dignity. The upshot of this account is two-fold. First, it explains many features of international law that other theories leave unaccounted for or under-explained. And second, my dignity-based account provides for a mechanism through which the system can continue to be developed and improved.
Journal of Medical Ethics (2019, with R. Powell)
We are grateful for the thoughtful attention the commentators and editors have given our paper. They raise many substantive points that warrant a response, but our reply must be brief. In our paper, "Rethinking 'Disease': A Fresh Diagnosis and a New Philosophical Treatment," we argue for an amended hybrid account of ‘disease’ in human medicine that takes normative ethics seriously, guards against pernicious classifications of disease and reconnects the concept with the goals of healthcare institutions in which disease diagnosis is embedded. Carel and Tekin, in their respective replies, raise issues about the objectivity and effective operationalisation of our account, Agar makes an ‘evolutionary’ case for disease concept eliminativism in mental health, and Wakefield and Conrad contend that our proposed modification to the harmful dysfunction account is unnecessary and undesirable. In this piece, we respond to each in turn.
the American Journal of Bioethics (2022)
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) the Court argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protected “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.” Not only did the Court argue this grounded the procreative rights of pregnant persons, but in the decades that followed this language also served as the basis for the greatest expansion of LGBTQ+ rights in American history, including: Lawrence v. Texas (2003), United States v. Windsor (2013), and Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). This commentary argues that these advances are not only at risk in Dobbs v. Jackson, but that the “dignitary harms” found to be prohibited in these subsequent decisions give us reason to believe the Court should recognize greater protections for the procreative liberties of pregnant persons.
the Journal of Applied Philosophy (forthcoming)
Talk of ‘dignity’ is everywhere. As Vincent Lloyd notes, in Black Dignity: The Struggle Against Domination, in its legal habitat ‘dignity’ has historically been used to denote a particularly high status. However, this focus on dignity as status, Lloyd argues, ignores a ‘richer sense of dignity’ (p. 3) that lays at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement, as well as ‘Black struggles of the past years, decades, and centuries’ more broadly (p. 24). That is, the sense of dignity as an activity you do. This sense of dignity, according to Lloyd, is the ‘cornerstone’ to understanding the underlying moral and political stance embodied in the Black Lives Matter movement (p. 22). This review works through some of the novel insights Lloyd brings to the ever growing philosophical debate about the nature of 'dignity,' and offers some thoughts about why we might do well not to abandon some historical understandings so quickly.
The history of abortion law in the United States has long been well trodden ground for many lawyers, scholars, and activists. Nevertheless, with decision in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022) now finalized, there has been a resurgence of interest in this topic from people around the world. In this post, I work through some of the reasoning offered by the Court in its decision to overturn Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) and Roe v. Wade (1973). Ultimately, I argue that the relevant ‘test’ the Court purports to adopt for determining what rights fall under the ‘liberty’ protected by the fourteenth amendment is misguided. Moreover and concerningly, this misguided test carries risks. Other liberties are vulnerable to the adoption of this test. Important protections, such as for same-sex marriage and interracial marriage, could be lost under the precedent of Dobbs. This majority decision has traded a sound jurisprudential tradition for a jurisprudence of doubt.
Policy driven by data and science represents the gold standard amongst politicians of all political stripes who seek to break through the partisan gridlock. From health and safety protocols surrounding COVID-19 to long term projects related to infrastructure and public transit, the ideal appears to be to let the data "speak for itself" and lead the way. In this post, we examine the relationship between science, scientific practices and policy making, and highlight one aspect of this relationship that has been underappreciated: namely, the relationship between science and policy making is symbiotic not unidirectional. Implicit and explicit value assumptions made by policymakers and scientists alike inevitably frame and shape the data we collect. As a result, we argue the relevant roles of scientists and policymakers have often been misunderstood, and appreciating the symbiotic relationship that exists between these two sets of actors may indicate a need to reform policymaking institutions such as the FDA and CDC.